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FEDERALISM FROM FEDERAL STATUTES:
HEALTH REFORM, MEDICAID, AND THE
OLD-FASHIONED FEDERALISTS’ GAMBLE
Abbe R. Gluck*
How can the states retain relevance in an era of federal statutory law?
The persistence of the states and our enduring attachment to “federalism” in
an increasingly national and global regulatory environment has occupied
the minds of many scholars.1 For the most part, however, the U.S. Supreme
Court, because of its role as the final expositor of constitutional meaning,
has been viewed as the primary arbiter of what federalism is and what is
required to protect it. Less often explored has been Congress’s role in
giving meaning to federalism in the modern administrative state.2
Specifically, the possibility to which this Essay wishes to draw attention is
that federal statutes may now be the primary way in which state power is
created and protected. To be clear, the claim is not about federal statutes
that are modest in ambition and leave most areas exclusively to state
regulation. Rather, the claim is about major federal statutes that, even as
they extend federal power, entrust to the states much of their
implementation and elaboration.
The 2010 health reform legislation—The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act3 (ACA)—is the most prominent recent example of
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. With thanks to Meir Feder, Heather
Gerken, Nicole Huberfeld, Sara Rosenbaum, Ted Ruger, Yale Law School students Josh
Rosenthal and Rebecca Wolitz, Ben Zipursky and the Fordham Law Review, and especially
to Jerry Mashaw, Henry Monaghan, Nate Persily, Judith Resnik, and, for outstanding
research assistance, Andrew Hammond. Special thanks to Ollie and Ryan Feder for their
continuing interest in “the law about doctors and hospitals.”
1. For a well-known example of one such treatment, see Larry Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 227, 234
(2000) (arguing that the political-party system has given the states an enduring voice on the
national level).
2. As shall be evident, my point is different from the famous “political safeguards”
argument. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954) (arguing that state representation in Congress and the nature of the political process
work to protect state autonomy). I assume that national action is the “ordinary,” not the
“special,” case and am interested in how such national action itself might generate and
protect the benefits and values that are more typically associated with autonomy-focused
theories of federalism.
3. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
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such a statute. And the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision about the
constitutionality of that statute revealed that the Court emphatically
disagrees with this Essay’s claim.4 But federalism proponents may be
doing their own cause a disservice with their reluctance to see federalism in
federal statutes.
Congress seems to have taken a different view. Since the New Deal,
Congress has repeatedly invited the states to be the front-line implementers
of its new federal laws—federal-statutory design decisions that are often
described by legislators as respectful of “federalism,” even as the new
national legislation displaces traditional state dominance over a particular
area of policy. Health reform, for example, invited the states to serve as
central policy-makers and implementers in key areas of the statute,
including its expansion of Medicaid and its establishment of insurance
exchanges (the law’s new “one stop shopping” portals for insurance
purchase).5
The Court, however, as well as some other self-identified state-power
proponents, appears to believe that state power is undermined, not
advanced, when Congress invites states into federal statutes in this manner.
But from a federalism-protective perspective, the Court’s position may well
have the reverse of its intended effect. Insisting on separation is unlikely to
stop Congress from legislating altogether. At most, it will encourage
Congress to legislate without state partners—a course of action that is likely
to increase, not decrease, national power.
The issue that brought these matters to the fore in health reform was the
ACA’s proposed Medicaid expansion. Medicaid is a half-century-old
federal program that is jointly administered by states and the federal
government, and has been incrementally expanded since its inception.
Medicaid’s paradigmatic “cooperative federalism” and its slow course of
development are the direct result of policymakers’ continued efforts to
bring the federal government into an arena dominated by the states while
still respecting “federalism.” But, in the health reform litigation, the Court
held that Congress’s most recent expansion of Medicaid went too far and in
the process implied that Congress loses some power over how it may
expand federal programs once it invites states to participate.6 In the name
of federalism, seven Justices held that states were effectively free to reject
the amendments to the Medicaid statute that Congress had passed and the
President had signed.
The Court’s opinion, however, relied on a vision of federalism that has
been on the decline at least since the New Deal. The Court insisted that
federalism and its benefits—including local control and the ability of states
4. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2201.
6. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan,
JJ.) (finding the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional); id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (joining the part of the Roberts opinion finding the
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional).
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to check federal power—are best effectuated by state separation from
federal law rather than state participation in it. That vision depends on what
no longer exists: significant areas of regulation that are reserved to the
states and into which federal lawmaking may not tread. Today, the states’
relevance on the national policymaking level comes mostly from
Congress’s discretion, not from the states’ exclusive control over policy as
a matter of (judicially monopolized) boundary-emphasizing constitutional
law. Congress may design federal statutes that retain central roles for states
or Congress may design federal statutes that displace the state function
entirely.
Health reform typifies this modern state of affairs. In designing the
statute, Congress followed its typical legislative path—one of incremental
federal lawmaking over a historical backdrop of state control—a path that,
as in the case of numerous social programs enacted over the past century,
produced a new federal statute that took some power from the states with
one hand but gave the states new (federal-law-granted) powers with the
other. The Court interpreted these moves as fundamentally antifederalist.
But would federalism really have been better served had Congress pushed
the states to the periphery?
Since the decision, moreover, some state-power proponents have taken
similar positions to the Court’s with respect to other aspects of the statute.
Specifically, the majority of Republican-controlled states have rejected
Congress’s offer to let the states, rather than the federal government, run the
Act’s new health insurance exchanges.7 Their effort, like the Court’s, is to
fight a battle already lost; that is, to try to derail the progress of this federal
lawmaking altogether. But the Court upheld the constitutionality of the rest
of the health reform statute, including the exchange provisions. The states’
decision not to participate thus opens the door to a wholesale federal
takeover of health insurance regulation in those same states that opposed
the federal law in the first place. What’s more, that opening may pave the
way for additional federal encroachment that might not otherwise occur if
states implemented the Act themselves.
The gamble is a big one. Unlike the contest over Congress’s power to
enact an insurance-purchase mandate—which received far more public
attention but is unlikely to arise again8—this federalism question is certain
to recur. Most major federal programs in this country rely at least in part on
the kind of state-led implementation that the Court’s opinion attempted to
7. Since the Court held in Printz v. United States that Congress cannot commandeer
state executive authority, Congress has given the states the choice to administer new federal
programs or to opt out. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). In the health reform statute, Congress
articulated a default-preference for state implementation of the exchanges but provided that
the federal government would run the exchanges for the states if the states opted out or were
unprepared to implement by the 2014 deadline.
8. The question whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to require
individuals to purchase health insurance is unlikely to arise again because such purchasemandates are rarely necessary and, in any event, Congress now knows to use a different
power (such as its taxing power) to effectuate the same result.
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deter. The Court’s opinion already has injected significant uncertainty into
these cooperative federalism schemes and may result in Congress using less
of them in the future.
This is not to say that Congress’s efforts to include the states always
effectuate federalist, as opposed to nationalist, goals, or that it is easy to tell
which federal-statutory moves are state protective. Different states might
take divergent views of different statutes and, of course, not everyone will
agree that state-protective policy solutions are normatively ideal for every
policy problem. Nor is it to say that Congress must not do a better job in
making clear how much power it intends to delegate to the states relative to
federal agencies or other implementers when it offers them roles in federal
administration.
The point, rather, is that these federal-statutoryimplementation relationships are the critical federalism relationships of the
statutory era. The real work to be done is not in eliminating these
partnerships altogether, but in recognizing Congress’s centrality in creating
them and the need for legal rules to govern their successful operation.
I. THE STAKES FOR HEALTH POLICY AND FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Health reform offered both Congress and the Supreme Court the
opportunity to address the modern conundrum of the states’ place in a legal
world dominated by federal statutes. Congress did so as a matter of health
policy; the Court did so as a matter of constitutional law. Neither did so
with particular clarity.
A. Health Policy
Federalism has been the subject of robust debate in the health policy
context for decades. The question in the policy context has typically been
framed as a functional one; that is, which level of government, state or
federal, is best situated to oversee health care regulation and finance?
Proponents of state regulation have emphasized the benefits of local
variation and the expertise of local health administrators in arguing for state
control. On the other side, nationalists emphasize that local regulation does
not work given the countercyclical nature of programs like Medicaid:
expenses for assistance programs increase during difficult economic times
when governments (especially states with balanced-budget requirements)
have less revenue to cover them. Nationalists also argue that state-level
health reform is impossible given the national market for health care:
providers and insurers will simply leave aggressive states if other states
have fewer restrictions.9
Congress essentially punted the answer to this health-policy question
when it enacted the ACA. As detailed below, the statute is a paradigm of
the kind of structural schizophrenia that results from incremental federal
9. For examples from this robust literature, see FEDERALISM AND HEALTH POLICY (John
Holahan et al. eds., 2003), and HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES
(Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996).
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lawmaking—over terrain historically controlled by the states—by a
Congress sensitive to undercutting federalism. The ACA offers few
answers to the functional question of where health administration ideally
should be located. Instead, as detailed below, the statute not only increases
federal authority, but also gives authority to the state and federal
governments acting together and leaves some authority in state hands alone,
as well as in the hands of private actors.
Of course, depending on the policy question at hand, such a varied
structural approach is not always undesirable. In the context of health
reform, however, the pre-ACA landscape of regulatory structural
fragmentation had been much lamented,10 and Congress disappointed the
many health policy experts who had hoped that the ACA would address the
field’s structural issues head-on. Congress did not, for example, address
why, as a matter of good policy, the nation’s health insurance program for
the elderly (Medicare) is run by the federal government, while the nation’s
health insurance program for the poor (Medicaid) is run jointly with the
states. Instead, the structure of the ACA (which extended both programs)
was the product of what might be called authority-allocating, federalisminspired path dependence: Congress gave the states a lead role in the new
federal statute in those same areas in which states had previously exerted
primary authority, namely, Medicaid and insurance regulation.
B. Law
On the legal side, this question of the modern state-federal relationship
has been framed differently, as one of constitutional structure; namely,
whether the Constitution’s protections of state sovereignty limit the way in
which the federal government uses (or does not use) the states to administer
or implement federal legislation. But the more provocative way to ask the
same question is to ask what the continuing relevance is at all of legal
doctrines that protect “federalism” in an era in which our most important
laws come from federal legislation that Congress has the power to enact
without any role for the states in the first place.
“Constitutional” federalism is typically a federalism defined by the
allocation of powers in our founding document and one that has been
understood by many to prescribe separate spheres of state and federal
responsibility and to have as its goal the preservation of state autonomy.
But, as many scholars have noted, that brand of federalism is increasingly
irrelevant. The New Deal brought the federal government squarely into
most areas of traditional state regulation, including the world of social
policy, and today, if statutes are crafted properly, there are few areas into
which the federal government may not go. As such, the apposite question is
not how federalism should protect what are now mostly nonexistent areas of

10. See THE FRAGMENTATION
Elhauge ed., 2010).

OF
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exclusive state authority.11 Rather, the apposite question is whether there
might be a new type of federalism—which might be called intrastatutory
federalism—that functions within the world of federal statute making. Is
there a federalism in which state power comes from federal statutes—from
Congress’s decision to design federal laws that rely on state
administration—rather than a federalism in which state power derives from
its separation from federal law?
In the health reform case, seven Justices refused to acknowledge the
possibility of this modern expression of our foundational state-federal
relationship. The joint dissent (for Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito) expressly disputed the proposition that Congress’s decision to allow
“state employees to implement a federal program is more respectful of
federalism than using federal workers alone,” and asserted that “[t]his
argument reflects a view of federalism that our cases have rejected.”12 The
Chief Justice’s opinion, like the joint dissent, extolled the “independent
power of the States . . . as a check on the power of the Federal
Government.”13
Both opinions read as homages to federalism. But the federalism that the
Court embraced was federalism in its bygone, separate-spheres form. The
structural choice for Congress in health reform was not, as the Court would
have it, “federal legislation versus state legislation.” Rather, the structural
question was “federal legislation administered by whom?”
Congress answered that question in health reform by including the states
as front-line partners in the implementation of several parts of the statute,
including in its Medicaid expansion. Congress did not need to do this, as
all nine Justices acknowledged: the federal government unquestionably had
the constitutional power to implement the Medicaid expansion all by itself.
But the Court viewed Congress’s attempt to expand Medicaid in its joint
state-federal form as an encroachment on federalism. Specifically,
Congress conditioned continued state involvement in Medicaid on a state’s
acquiescence to Congress’s new amendments to the program. The Court
viewed this as a coercive trap that violated state sovereignty: given
Medicaid’s centrality in every state, the Court opined, states had little
choice but to go along with Congress’s amendments.
I have previously written about the way in which state implementation of
national law may, indeed, sometimes be a tool of national encroachment.14
But one also must consider the alternative, and that is the point of this
Essay: in a world of near limitless federal power to spend money for social

11. For an excellent treatment of the opposite view, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008)
(arguing federalism without autonomy is simply decentralization).
12. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2642, 2660 (2012) (joint dissent).
13. Id. at 2578 (majority opinion).
14. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011).
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welfare,15 and given Congress’s proven tendency to legislate incrementally
(i.e., through a series of amendments over time) what good does the Court’s
opinion do the states, or the cause of federalism? Now that the Court has
limited Congress’s flexibility to legislate incrementally when it utilizes state
partners, perhaps Congress will think twice before including the states at all
the next time.
The Court did not acknowledge this possibility, or the possibility that
state administration of federal law might sometimes empower, rather than
undermine, state players.16 Instead, the Court may have assumed that
erecting barriers to state implementation of federal law would stop
Congress from enacting major federal legislation altogether. This is a
dubious assumption at best. Every modern president—from President
Nixon and the Clean Air Act,17 to President George W. Bush and No Child
Left Behind,18 to President Obama and the ACA19—has passed major
federal legislation. The New Deal tide will not so easily be turned back.
II. INTRASTATUTORY FEDERALISM AS THE FEDERALISM OF
THE MODERN ERA
In legal circles, only a handful of commentators have even acknowledged
the possibility that federal statutes, in general, might be a source of
constitutional interpretation and change.20 Even among that number,
matters of federal statutory design are rarely described as federalism
constituting. Still rarer—because it is so antithetical to the state autonomy
typically associated with federalism—is a lawyer’s understanding of
federalism as a relationship that comes by the grace of Congress.
But most major policy initiatives since the New Deal seem to embrace
this possibility. From the early family and old-age assistance laws, to the
15. This is because Congress can tax and spend as it wishes for the general welfare, see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, a power that even the conservative wing of the Court agrees
gives Congress enormous authority over social policy. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643
(joint dissent).
16. There is some evidence that this notion of empowerment, though perhaps counterintuitive to some, may be taking broader hold. Heather Gerken, for example, makes a
similar point in a speech written independently at approximately the same time as this Essay.
See Heather Gerken, The Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming
2013) (on file with author); see also Ted Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the
Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE (Persily et
al. eds., forthcoming 2013) (predicting that states will use waivers under health reform for
leverage).
17. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006)).
18. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
20. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with author); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); Ernest A. Young, The
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
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environmental statutes of the 1970s, to the health reform legislation of
2010, Congress has invoked federalism in giving states the option of
serving as primary implementers of the most important federal programs.
Moreover, in the same spirit of federalism, Congress often gives states
flexibility to do this federal work; for example, by establishing federal
floors above which states may innovate or by allowing states to apply for
waivers from federal requirements so that they can experiment with ways to
accomplish the federal law’s goals. In turn, the states have constructed
local administrative bureaucracies to implement federal policy and,
concomitantly, have become ever more expert in the areas entrusted to their
administration. In this fashion, Congress has allowed the states to remain
important players in the current policymaking world.21
A. Motivations
There are many good and varied reasons why Congress relies on the
states to implement federal law.22 Some of these reasons are pragmatic:
the federal government does not have sufficient personnel to administer its
programs, and state administrators often are more expert. Some reasons are
functional: certain programs may benefit from regional variation (water
policy, for example, may look different in the Northeast and the
Southwest); or Congress may wish to incentivize state-level
experimentation in federal policy administration to generate data for future
national policy decisions.
Other motivations may be instrumental. State administration of new
federal programs may make federal legislative expansions more politically
palatable for those who prefer (at least the appearance of) “small”
government. Running controversial federal programs through the states
also may diffuse federal accountability. Sometimes, these moves are
“nationalist” in nature: a use of the states to increase federal power in a
below-the-radar fashion. Other times (or perhaps simultaneously), they
may be an effort to effectuate values that we normally associate with
“federalism,” even as Congress steps in to regulate. For example, a federal
law that relies on state implementation might be a way of expressing a
preference for experimentation, local control, or respect for areas of
traditional state expertise.
The point is not that Congress’s reliance on state administration is always
“ideal” from a state-power perspective or that there is a single model to
evaluate. Some statutes delegate power equally to all implementing states;
others give certain states leadership roles developing national policy.23
21. Cooperative federalism existed before the New Deal too, but it has become
ubiquitous since. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1649–50 (2007)
(describing early cooperative federalism in quarantine laws).
22. For elaboration, see Gluck, supra note 14.
23. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (2006) (providing California a
special authorization to “adopt and enforce” emissions standards).
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Some statutes give states much policymaking discretion, while others use
states to administer what are essentially uniform national programs. In the
ACA alone, we see this type of dizzying variety.24 The point is that
congressional reliance on state implementation is ubiquitous and complex,
and that legal doctrine currently offers no tools that assist in evaluating its
many forms. The point is also that state implementation, at least some of
the time, can offer states a voice in national policymaking.
B. Is This “Federalism”?
Some will likely contest that this is “federalism” at all. Protesters may
offer “decentralization” as a preferred label,25 precisely because the state
presence comes at Congress’s pleasure. But more is going on here than the
managerial allocation of responsibility. In fact, it seems unmistakable that
federalism norms are being expressed in at least some of these statutes.
Consider, as an example, the question whether to centralize
administration of the ACA’s newly created insurance exchanges in the
federal government or whether to give the states the right of first refusal to
exercise control over their administration—a question that was not at issue
in the litigation. This exchange governance was the key question that
divided the House and Senate versions of the legislation, with the Senate
invoking “federalism” values to insist on the state-leadership default
preference that ultimately carried the day. But make note: this federalism
was to come in the form of state administration of federal law—not in the
exclusion of the federal government from the field.
And let’s be clear. As a matter of existing constitutional doctrine, most
people agree that the federal government could implement programs like
the environmental statutes or health reform all by itself. In the health
reform case, what divided the Court was not whether Congress had the
constitutional power to expand access to government-provided health
insurance but rather how Congress did it.
Perhaps the Court would have reached a different answer had it thought
about the question in terms of that choice. Consider again, in this light, the
health insurance exchanges. As a result of the triumph of the state-led
version of those exchanges, individuals and small businesses in those states
that accept Congress’s invitation to run the exchanges will continue to
purchase health insurance through state-governed channels, a result that, at
least on the surface, appears consistent with the traditional presumption
(itself legislatively established through Congress’s discretion in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945) that health-insurance regulation is an area
of state control. As a matter of formal constitutional doctrine, of course, an
exchange run by the federal government would be no different: federal
law—the ACA—will regulate the exchanges no matter who runs them. But
as a matter of how individual Americans will experience this regulation, it
24. Gluck, supra note 14.
25. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 11, at 20–37 (2008).
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will be on the local level. And as a matter of what level of government is
setting much of the relevant policy, it is still the states, precisely because
Congress—even though it didn’t have to—built state-implementation
flexibility into the statute. The same point can be made about the difference
between expanding access to health insurance through Medicaid, which
puts states at the forefront, as opposed to through Medicare, which does not.
The Chief Justice himself began his opinion by writing that traditional
federalism assures that “the facets of governing that touch on citizens daily
lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the
governed.”26 The Court seemed too quick, however, to conclude that
erecting barriers to state implementation of federal law would serve that
goal. Fifteen years earlier, in Printz v. United States,27 another highly
contested case about state administration of federal law, the dissenting
Justices (including Justice Breyer, who joined the Chief Justice in the
ACA’s Medicaid ruling) put the question more realistically. “Why, or
how,” the dissent asked, “would what the majority sees as a constitutional
alternative—the creation of a new federal . . . law bureaucracy, or the
expansion of an existing federal bureaucracy—better promote either state
sovereignty or individual liberty?”28 The Printz dissenters also might have
asked how it would better promote administration of law by those
governments closest to the people.
It remains a subject for debate whether the kinds of “everyday”
experiences with state administration that the state exchanges and Medicaid
will offer are federalism in the “constitutional” sense. But it is not clear
that the labels really matter.29 One can argue that the prevalence of these
kinds of arrangements has shaped and changed what federalism means as a
matter of “constitutional law,” or one can argue alternatively that, if
26. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
27. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
28. Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting joined by Stevens, J.); see also id. at 959 (Stevens,
J., dissenting joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (“By limiting the ability of the
Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court
creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State’s
rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to
implement its policies. This is exactly the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised
would not occur, in part as a result of the National Government’s ability to rely on the
magistracy of the States.”). Cf. Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class
Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of
Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1966 (2008) (arguing that, by
including the states, “[a] national response can emerge without turning everything into a
‘federal case.’”).
29. The doctrinal relevance of labeling in this context seems to go to the alterability of
the doctrines announced. To the extent that one believes that Congress’s federal statutory
design decisions are creating new constitutional understandings of federalism, then perhaps
future congresses, and even courts, have less power to alter those understandings than they
would have to interpret and change statutory understandings. This possibility raises a host of
other questions, however—including the presumptive unconstitutionality of congressional
efforts to bind the hands of future congresses—that require deeper consideration elsewhere
(and which also attach to most theories of statutes-as-constitutional-law, see supra note 20,
not just the one advanced here).
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constitutional federalism is only about federalism in the sense of autonomy,
then that brand of federalism is increasingly irrelevant. But the potential
irrelevance of constitutional federalism in its narrowest sense does not
mean that something often very state centered has not replaced it.
III. THE ACA’S TAPESTRY OF FEDERALISM
Of course, the reason that the Supreme Court had occasion to address the
intrastatutory federalism question at all is because of how the ACA was
designed.
A. The ACA’s Structural Fragmentation
For the past century, two overarching questions have dominated the
health-policy discourse. The first question is that of the health care
system’s basic normative framework: whether we should have a system
that rests on “personal responsibility” (everyone for him/herself) or, instead,
whether a “solidarity” model (one that emphasizes “mutual aid and
support”) should govern.30 The second question is the structural one, and
asks which level of government, state or federal (or perhaps the private
sector), should be responsible for ensuring access to health care for those
deemed entitled to receive it.
Congress tackled both questions when it passed the ACA. Or, more
accurately, it tried to answer the first and declined to answer the second.
The ACA offers the strongest federal legislative position thus far on the
personal responsibility-versus-solidarity debate. The statute’s primary goal
is universal access to health care (i.e., solidarity), which it accomplishes by
making health insurance available to as many Americans as possible.31 The
Medicaid expansion at issue in the litigation was one part of that effort,
along with other aspects of the statute, including amendments to Medicare,
the establishment of the health insurance exchanges, the provision of
subsidies for the purchase of insurance, and the imposition of new
requirements on insurers to make insurance more accessible. To make the
reforms economically viable for insurers, the law expands the pool of
insured citizens, requiring almost all individuals to have insurance (or be
covered through one of the federal assistance programs), a requirement
colloquially referred to as the “individual mandate.”32

30. Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform,
14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 205, 207 (2008).
31. The statute is not unequivocal on this point. Some provisions, particularly the socalled “wellness provisions” that allow healthy individuals to reduce their insurance costs,
reflect a reluctance to leave the personal responsibility model completely behind. See
generally Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk and Responsibility After the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011); Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law As
Disability Rights Law, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10106(b), 124
Stat. 119, 909–11 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2011)).
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But Congress essentially punted the second, structural, health-policy
question. The ACA is a Solomonic and mostly unsatisfying response to the
functional question of whether the states or the federal government are best
situated to oversee health care, or even to the preliminary question of
whether government (any government) should be involved in health care in
the first place.
Instead, the ACA offers something for everyone, and does not justify as a
functional matter why it divides the world the way it does. The statute
includes all of the following government-structure models: a federal-only
model in the statute’s Medicare reforms; a cooperative-federalism model in
the statute’s Medicaid expansion and health insurance exchange provisions;
a new “hybrid” federalism model, created in the ACA’s implementing
regulations, that allows states to take the lead but allows the federal
government to perform certain tasks that benefit from centralization or
economies of scale across groups of states; and a state-only model that
expressly leaves certain functions entirely in state hands.33 The statute also
includes a private market model in its reliance on employer-provided,
private insurance as the default system. (Indeed, the fact that the statute
calls the insurance-purchase mandate a “personal responsibility”
requirement is likely no coincidence; the label, and the maintenance of the
private insurance system, appear to be nods toward those who would prefer
a private-market, antisolidarity model altogether.)
The Court’s opinion was essentially a reflection on these two healthpolicy questions, reframed in legal terms. With respect to the first question,
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the joint dissent, in discussing both the
mandate and the Medicaid expansion, each evinced profound discomfort
with Congress’s policy preference for the solidarity model, and each
repeatedly blanched at the notion of the healthy subsidizing the sick. The
link between that normative discomfort and the constitutional-law holdings
in the opinions is a fascinating subject, but one beyond the scope of this
Essay. The remainder of the Essay focuses on the second, structural
question: namely, the ACA’s use of intrastatutory federalism and the
Court’s reaction to it.
B. The Link Between Federalism and Federal Policy Incrementalism
What explains the ACA’s structural diversity? It does not appear that
any health policy expert has claimed that it was the result of a considered
policy decision. Instead, the statute’s something-for-everyone approach to
the state’s role seems to have been the result of politics (getting to the right
number of votes) and path dependence. Specifically, the road to the ACA’s
structural fragmentation was typical of the incremental way in which
Congress legislates. The Court did not seem to understand this, or at least
did not acknowledge it.
Nor did the Court recognize that such
33. For more detail about the fragmented structure of the Act, see generally Gluck,
supra note 14.
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incrementalism tends to favor the development of federal statutes that
include central, albeit sometimes fragmented, roles for the states.
1. Incrementalism and State Entrenchment
Political scientists have consistently demonstrated that Congress
legislates in piecemeal fashion.34 There are many reasons for the
persistence of this policy incrementalism, including the numerous barriers
to lawmaking of any sort in Congress and the difficulty of attaining
consensus in a polity as diverse as ours. Of particular relevance here, there
is also an explicit link between Congress’s tendency toward policy
incrementalism and the design of federal statutes that rely on state
administration. This is largely because what often precedes our incremental
federal legislation, especially in the social policy arena, is decades of
lawmaking, expertise building, and institution entrenching by the states that
previously occupied the field.
The historical backdrop of state social policy regulation creates both
political and pragmatic incentives for Congress to rely on, rather than to
displace, entrenched state administrative apparatus. As a political matter,
the same federalism-like concerns about big government and respect for
traditional areas of state authority often are cited to support state
administration of federal law. Pragmatically, in addition to the lack of
sufficient federal personnel, earlier-established state bureaucracies provide
ready experts to implement new federal legislation should the states wish to
participate.
The result can be a policy scheme that is structurally fragmented in
multiple ways. The new federal program, like the ACA, may have some
aspects designed to be implemented by the states and other aspects designed
to be implemented by the federal government. Even with respect to those
aspects designed to be implemented by the states, states sometimes opt out,
in which case the federal government must step in to operate the program in
some states but not in others. The new federal program also rarely occupies
the entire field, and so substantial regulatory power often remains, as it
historically had been, under exclusive state control.
The 1965 legislation that gave birth to Medicare and Medicaid offers a
quintessential example of this type of federal policy development.35 The
health-policy backdrop to the Social Security Act of 1965 was essentially a
system of limited charity care provided by the states and localities to the
“deserving poor.” Conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats, both
concerned about federal-government aggrandizement, opposed expansion
of the federal government into health care. As a result, during the federal
legislative process, non-southern Democrats focused on incremental
34. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79, 84 (1959).
35. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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expansion, targeting their efforts at a particularly sympathetic population
(the elderly) as beneficiaries of the new federal health insurance program.
The resulting compromise has been described as a “three-layer cake,”36 a
metaphor that captures its inclusion of, among other things, both federaland state-led insurance models. The decision to lodge what became
Medicaid in the states was partially the result of the kind of path
dependence described above37: Even though the new program was a
federal program, it was state run, and as such was viewed as an extension of
prior state charity-care efforts, rather than as a major reform of them.38 But
making Medicaid state administered also was an effort to prevent further
federal encroachment: federalism proponents wished to “put a fence around
Medicare,”39 treating that program as an exceptional federal venture into
the health care arena and maintaining state control as the norm. This
deserves emphasis. Designing a federal law so that it could be implemented
by the states was seen as protective of federalism. Completing the
fragmentation, the statute left large swaths of regulation entirely in state
hands, including the regulation of the private insurance industry.40
The same story can be told outside the health care arena. Indeed, one is
hard-pressed to identify any examples of major social policy legislation in
which Congress wiped the slate clean of all preexisting state structures and
enacted comprehensive, federal-only reform in a single legislative effort.
From the near half-century transformation of the state-administered federal
food-stamp program—incremental change that occurred through a series of
federally authorized state experiments (“demonstration projects”) and
congressional amendments;41 to the enactment of the Supplemental
Security Income Program as an effort to standardize the state-led Old-Age
Assistance and Aid to the Blind programs;42 to the early federal efforts to
fund state environmental programs that eventually led to the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts;43 to the 1935 Social Security Act’s evolution from an

36. STUART ALTMAN & DAVID SHACTMAN, POWER, POLITICS, AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH
CARE: THE INSIDE STORY OF A CENTURY-LONG BATTLE 139 (2011).
37. Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 445–47
(2012).
38. Id.
39. ALTMAN & SHACTMAN, supra note 36, at 141.
40. State control over private insurance essentially continued until the 1974 ERISA
statute partially eroded it. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, § 514, 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006)).
41. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16, and 21 U.S.C.); Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-435, 102 Stat. 1645 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
42. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2639 n.23 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
43. The first Federal Clean Air Act, enacted in 1963, provided grants to state and local
air pollution control districts. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). The first Federal
Clean Water Act of 1948 (also known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act) was
“primarily based on state and local efforts.” The Clean Water Act: Protecting and Restoring
our Nation’s Waters, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/action/cleanwater40/cwa101.cfm (last
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effort to replace state old-age pension programs to its expanded form
today,44 this is the common arc of modern federal policy development.
Moreover, there is a cycle here, one in which state-based federal policy
incrementalism continues to perpetuate itself. With each new federal
program that relies on state implementation, state administrative
bureaucracies are further expanded and become more expert. This, in turn,
makes their continuing utilization by the federal government more likely.
The ACA is no exception. Despite the Court’s emphasis on the statute’s
length and scope, the ACA’s main components are drawn from preexisting
programs (which themselves were the product of an incremental legislative
approach). The ACA expands Medicare, Medicaid, and the private
insurance system, rather than putting in place the kind of more coherent
structure one would expect (and many had hoped for) had Congress been
drafting from scratch. In so doing, Congress perpetuated, rather than
dismantled, the entrenched and fragmented structure of health
administration and continued to rely heavily on state bureaucracies.
In this sense, the incremental way in which Congress legislates reinforces
the centrality of state administration. Interestingly, the Chief Justice
himself recognized this state-entrenchment point in his opinion, noting that
“the States have developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes
over the course of many decades to implement their objectives under
existing Medicaid.”45 But the Chief Justice viewed that pattern as evidence
only that states may become trapped in federal programs, rather than also as
a potential tool through which states may preserve their centrality in and
leverage over future federal legislation.
2. Incrementalism and State Experimentation
Federal policy incrementalism also finds its expression in policy
experimentalism, and this is another way in which the states remain relevant
to the development of federal statutory law. The notion that Congress lacks
competence to address the complex social problems on its plate is
commonplace, as is the notion that this complexity leads Congress to rely
on expert federal agencies rather than drafting detailed legislative solutions.
Less often acknowledged, however, is the way in which intrastatutory
federalism serves a similar purpose. Part of what motivates legislative
incrementalism is a lack of information about the “best” policy answer46
and a related desire to test policies before expanding upon them. State
administration of federal law is a modern-era twist on the historical concept

visited Feb. 15, 2013) (citing Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948)).
44. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639 n.23 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 2604.
46. See Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of
Gun Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 516 (2008).
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of the “states as laboratories”47 and allows for more policy experimentation
than federal administration alone.
The ACA, for instance, has an extraordinary number of pilot projects
written into the law.48 These pilot projects are directed at policy questions
for which Congress had no definitive answers (such as how to reduce costs
without sacrificing quality of care). The ACA also evinces an explicit
preference for state policy experimentation within the confines of the new
federal law. Like countless other cooperative federalism programs, the
ACA encourages states to experiment with how they choose to implement
the new federal statute. In the context of the ACA’s insurance-exchange
provisions alone, the statute mentions “state flexibility” six times49 and
explicitly contemplates that the exchanges will look different across the
states. Like No Child Left Behind,50 Medicaid,51 the Clean Air Act,52 and
many other federal programs, the ACA also has a waiver provision that
permits states, with permission, to substitute their own programs to
accomplish the federal statute’s goal.53
As students of federalism well know, the states’ role as “laboratories” of
experimentation is one of the most frequently touted benefits of state
sovereignty.54 But this mode of experimentation increasingly does not
come from sovereignty-emphasizing federalism. Scholars have illustrated
that states do not conduct experiments at the levels thought ideal by
policymakers when states are left to their own devices.55 The dearth of
state-led policy experimentation is due to, among other things, the
disincentives for a single state to bear all the costs of innovation and the
risk that businesses will leave a state if it regulates in a more costly manner
than others. Federal laws that allow for state experimentation provide an
answer to this problem, and, ironically, such federal laws thereby help
“federalism” realize its potential. Indeed, some of the most important state
47. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
48. See Vince Kuraitis, Pilots, Demonstration & Innovation in the PPACA Health
Reform Legislation, E-CAREMANAGEMENT BLOG (Mar. 28, 2010), http://e-caremanagement
.com/pilots-demonstrations-innovation-in-the-ppaca-healthcare-reform-legislation.
49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311, 1321,
1331, 1411, 1412, 124 Stat. 119, 186, 199, 231 (2010) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 18041, 18051, 18082 (Supp. V 2011)).
50. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 9401, 115 Stat. 1425,
1972–75 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2006)).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006).
52. Id. § 7543(b).
53. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18052
(Supp. V 2011)).
54. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 610–11 (1980); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925–26
(1994). See generally David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:
Democratic
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008).
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policy experiments of the modern era have been conducted in the course of
state administration of federal law.
There is a long history of federal law developing in reaction to and in
dialogue with these state-led federal-policy experiments.
In the
environmental context, for instance, satisfactory levels of state innovation
in the area of air-pollution control did not occur organically, even with the
promise of federal funds, until Congress passed the major environmental
statutes of the 1970s that effectively required the states to take the lead or
have their air-quality laws preempted by federal statute. And in the
Medicaid context, it was the states that first took advantage of that
program’s flexibility to expand the benefits-eligible population beyond the
federal statute’s initial target of children and their mothers. These state
experiments, supported and incentivized by the federal government, formed
the basis of Medicaid’s subsequent national expansions to cover those same
populations.
So, too, the philosophy behind the ACA’s own Medicaid expansion—
eligibility based on an income threshold rather than demographic
categories—was first pioneered as a Medicaid state option by a few
aggressive states. The Massachusetts health reform law56—the law on
which much of the ACA was based—was itself made possible by a
Medicaid waiver granted by the Bush Administration.57 All of these are
examples of experimentalism that derives from intrastatutory federalism,
not from federalism in its traditional form.
IV. THE COURT’S OLD-FASHIONED FEDERALISM
The way in which federal policy incrementalism perpetuates a central
role for the states has obvious salience for the Court’s holding in the health
reform case. A majority of Justices have now erected a barrier to that kind
of legislative incrementalism—a barrier that may undermine the very state
authority that the Court sought to advance. Seven Justices took the position
that Congress does not have control over the amendment of its own federal
programs when the states are its chosen administrative partners.58 Instead,
the Court held that those state partners are sometimes entitled to reject the
statutory amendment and still remain part of the pre-amendment version of
the program.59 Applied to the ACA, the decision means that states are free
to reject the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid but may continue to participate
in the pre-ACA version of Medicaid, even though that is a version that
Congress abandoned when it passed the reform bill.
As a matter of structural formalism, there is something bizarre about this
holding once one understands this modern federalism as a federalism that
essentially is shaped by Congress. So understood, and as elaborated below,
56. 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58.
57. Ryan Lizza, Romney’s Dilemma, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2011, at 38, 40.
58. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2666–67 (joint dissent).
59. Id. at 2607–08 (majority opinion).
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one might expect the Court to impose certain hurdles for the legislative
process to clear if Congress wishes to utilize state partners. But there is
something strange about the Court allowing the states effectively to create
and participate in their own version of a federal program—by virtue of
refusing to participate in Congress’s amended version—when the states had
no right to participate in the program in the first place.
On a practical level, moreover, the decision risks creating precisely the
wrong kinds of legislative incentives from the standpoint of those who
would further state power. To be sure, it is possible that the next time
Congress wishes to accomplish an insurance expansion it will enlist the
states’ help relatively condition-free (for example, using the block grants
popular with old-fashioned federalists). Or perhaps it will think twice about
legislating at all. The Court itself has noted, in a 1986 case about the
incremental expansion of Social Security benefits, that a “constitutional rule
that would invalidate Congress’s attempts to proceed cautiously in
awarding increased benefits might deter Congress from making any
increases at all.”60 These sorts of outcomes—namely, stymying legislation
altogether or allowing the states to regulate with few federal strings—are
likely the kinds of outcomes that the Court’s federalists desire.
But it also is possible that, the next time, Court-watching statutory
drafters will still decide to legislate and, to steer clear of the Court’s new
constitutional obstacle, will do so in a more nationalist manner. This would
not be the federalists’ desired result. It is true that the Medicaid challenge
in the ACA case was brought by some states themselves, but half of the
states argued the other side, and no modern federalism proponents today are
advocating nationalizing Medicaid. Such an idea (an effective “Medicare
for all”) has been anathema to federalists at least since Ronald Reagan
famously associated that possibility with “socialized medicine.”61
In fact, it was federalism proponents who supported the creation of the
state-led Medicaid program in the first place, as part of the Social Security
Act’s 1965 legislative compromise, just as it was the more traditionally
federalist house of Congress, the Senate, that insisted that the ACA’s
insurance exchanges be operated by the states instead of the federal
government. It is also no coincidence that, now that the Court has upheld
the rest of the ACA, some policymakers are invoking “federalism” to try to
convince states to establish their own health insurance exchanges under the
Act rather than letting the federal government operate the exchanges for
them. As one governor put it: “[A] federally facilitated exchange is not the
ideal approach. Regulating the insurance market is a power best left in the
hands of the states.”62 A well-known conservative economist has argued

60. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).
61. Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine, YOUTUBE (Aug. 1, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRdLpem-AAs (audio of 1961 LP of the same name).
62. Elizabeth Crisp, Federal Government Will Start Setting Up Missouri’s Health
Exchange, ST. LOUIS TODAY (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-
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that allowing the federal government to operate the state exchanges would
open the door to a nationally run health care program.63 Of course, now
that the ACA has been upheld, as a formal (constitutional) matter, the
federal government is regulating the insurance market regardless. But as
these comments reveal, in today’s world, both as a practical matter and also
as a matter of how a program is understood and experienced, which level of
government is doing the implementing of federal law is, indeed, a question
about federalism.
The Court’s decision also may unproductively incentivize
comprehensive, rather than incremental, lawmaking. This is because the
decision effectively tells Congress that it may not be able to amend federal
programs later if Congress still wishes to use state administrators. Putting
aside the political impossibility of such comprehensive lawmaking on a
routine basis, it also seems remarkably unwise given the complexity of
modern legislative problems. One benefit of incrementalism is its
reversibility.
State-led federal policy incrementalism, moreover, is
particularly reversible because the experimentation often occurs on a
smaller scale.64
It is something of a mystery why a Supreme Court so concerned with the
expansion of federal power would obstruct gradual, state-led federal policy
development in this manner. The most plausible explanation is that the
Court wished to turn back the tide of major federal legislation altogether; or
perhaps the Court simply took particular offense at the policy choices in
this statute. As noted, the Chief Justice’s opinion and the joint dissent are
laced with distaste for the social solidarity model that the ACA embraces,
and both condemned the Medicaid expansion for its role in this effort. But
even those Justices acknowledged that the days of only minor federal-law
intrusions into daily American life have long since passed.
A. Nationalism or State Leverage?
Let us now examine the other side of this coin. State administration of
federal law does not always work to empower the states. Instead, state
administration may offer the federal government a subtle path toward
encroachment on state terrain.65 Relatedly, it may be a way for Congress to
obscure its political accountability for particularly unpopular decisions. In
such contexts, intrastatutory federalism may have a nationalizing, not
federalizing, effect.

politics/political-fix/federal-government-will-start-setting-up-missouri-s-health-exchange/
article_4bee6ae8-6b8d-5c6c-9ecf-e90dd36234b6.html (statement of Gov. Jay Nixon).
63. See Douglas Holtlz-Eakin, Yes to State Exchanges, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 6,
2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/334956/yes-state-exchangesdouglas-holtz-eakin.
64. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, & WELFARE 83
(1953).
65. For elaboration of these arguments, see generally Gluck, supra note 14.
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The seven Justices who voted to strike down the Medicaid expansion
focused especially on these arguments about accountability, encroachment,
and the diminishment of independent state power. But their specific
arguments seemed ill tailored to the matters at hand. The Justices’ focus on
accountability, for example, translates badly to the doctrinal test that they
articulated, which effectively allows Congress to engage in small-scale—
and therefore less visible—expansions of cooperative federalist programs
but holds that larger changes raise constitutional concerns. If anything, the
public is more likely to know where to place blame for major, not minor,
changes.
With respect to traditional state functions, the joint dissent emphasized
that allowing the Medicaid expansion “would permit Congress to dictate
policy in areas traditionally governed primarily at the state or local level.”66
This concern, however, ignores the fact that Congress can use its broad
power to tax and spend for the general welfare67 in areas of traditional state
control regardless of whether the states are co-implementers. Medicare is
precisely such an effort.
And with respect to the balance of powers, the Chief Justice emphasized
the “independent power of the States . . . as a check on the power of the
Federal Government.”68 But the Court seemed wrong to invoke state
“independence” as a real-world limitation on federal authority. Once one
accepts, as the Court did, that Congress has extremely broad power to
regulate by itself (if it is willing to use the taxing power), the best chance
that the states have to limit or shape the federalization of government
functions is via their representation in Congress and through their role as
implementers of federal law. States must protect their power through the
national political process, rather than by offering an alternative to it. If
anything, the famous “political safeguards of federalism”69 have special
salience here.
The joint dissent did recognize that Congress has become dependent on
state implementation.70 Although the Justices did not see political leverage
in that dependence, others have. Numerous scholars have described how
the states exert formidable political power over the shape of the federal laws
they are designated to implement.71 It was no coincidence that the National
Governors Association and the National Association of [State] Insurance
66. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) (joint dissent).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
68. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
69. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 544 (1954).
70. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2657–58.
71. See, e.g., JOHN NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 201 (2009); Kramer, supra note 1, at 283 (“Because
the federal government depends on state administrators to oversee or implement so many of
its programs, states have been able to use their position in the administrative system to
protect state institutional interests in Congress.”); cf. Ruger, supra note 16.
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Commissioners were active political operators as the ACA was developed
and that their efforts had a real effect on how the statute was drafted.
A separate and much more difficult question is who “speaks” for the
states in the political process (votes in the Senate? The National Governors
Association? Amicus Brief sign-ons? etc.) or whether it even makes sense
to think of “the states” as a single unit, with unified interests, when in fact
states often take different sides on federalism-related questions (here, too,
the ACA is no exception).72 Some states also may have disproportionate
power relative to others.73 As one particularly famous example of the
difficulty of evaluating the question of whether any specific federal statute
is state protective, recall the high-profile federalism case New York v.
United States, in which the Court invalided as violative of federalism a
federal statutory scheme that was constructed by a coalition of state
governors, speaking for the majority of the National Governors Association,
as an effort to preserve state power.74
These difficulties, however, are not a reason for the Court to incentivize
Congress to leave the states out of its legislative schemes. Instead, they are
difficulties related to how legal doctrines should be constructed. They
reveal the kinds of questions attendant to understanding and evaluating
modern federal-state relations, and the Court’s opinion in the ACA case
offers no roadmap for answering them.
The Chief Justice likewise missed the most important point when he
disputed Justice Ginsburg’s contention that the extent of Congress’s
constitutional power to expand Medicaid is proven by the fact that Congress
could replace the statute altogether.75 The Chief Justice wrote that
“[p]ractical constraints would plainly inhibit, if not preclude, the Federal
Government from repealing the existing program and putting every feature

72. Thanks to Judith Resnik for a clarifying conversation on this point.
73. Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 966 (2001) (arguing that the structure of the Senate
“ensures small population states a disproportionately large slice, and large population states
a disproportionately small slice, of the federal fiscal and regulatory ‘pie’” and so “obviously
infringes on the autonomy of the states that are burdened by, rather than beneficiaries of, this
redistribution.”).
74. See Brief for the Respondent, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Nos.
91-543, 91-558, 91-563), 1992 WL 526126, at *4–5 (“A task force headed by seven
Governors, working under the auspices of the National Governors’ Association (NGA),
proposed a ‘state solution’ to the [low-level radioactive waste] disposal problem, which the
NGA then presented to Congress with the unanimous support of its members.”); see also
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150–51 (1992) (“Relying largely on a report
submitted by the National Governors’ Association, . . . Congress declared a federal policy of
holding each State ‘responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either within or
outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders’
. . . .” (citations omitted)). Ironically, even New York supported the legislation. See Judith
Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 709, 749–51, (2008).
75. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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of Medicaid on the table for political reconsideration.”76 But what are those
“practical constraints” if not the same informal, political—and not
constitutional—federalism constraints of the sort that this Essay has
emphasized? State opposition to a wholesale elimination of Medicaid
would be fierce. Such a move, if the federal government then nationalized
the program, also would be perceived as a massive federal-government
takeover, even though as a formal matter it would be no different, since
Medicaid is a federal program in the first place. The predicted political
upheaval is what makes the repeal of Medicaid a practical (but not
constitutional) impossibility. This is modern federalism at work.
Indeed, the very fact that each of the opinions in the case is full of such
“practical” arguments illustrates that we are talking about something other
than sovereignty-based federalism. (For another example, consider the
dissent’s listing of the “practical reasons” preventing the states from
declining Medicaid funds, including the political difficulty of levying state
taxes to replace the lost federal money.77) As proof positive, the Court
could not, and in fact explicitly refused to, draw a doctrinal line to
demarcate the point at which congressional expansions of stateadministered federal programs become coercive. Instead, the Court
articulated a virtually unadministrable rule that recognizes the power of the
federal government to amend its state-led programs as it wishes so long as
the amendments are not too “dramati[c].”78 The “we-know-it-when-wesee-it” quality of this doctrine does not fit well with a theory of federalism
that depends on hard boundaries.
V. FEDERALISM AS A DOCTRINE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Essay has focused on the unrealistic assumptions about federalism
that underlie the Court’s opinion. How legal doctrine might evolve to
effectuate the different vision of federalism that I have offered requires
many more pages and much deeper consideration. But I wish to conclude
with one particular point about the direction that such doctrine might take,
and that is to emphasize that statutory, not constitutional, doctrines seem a
better fit for this context.
The Court has recognized this before: it has created a multitude of
statutory interpretation doctrines in the name of “federalism” that are not
really about the traditional, hard-boundary federalism that the health care
decision tried to resurrect. To take just one of many possible examples, the
presumption against preemption is a frequently employed rule of statutory
interpretation that requires Congress to be clear when it wishes to legislate
over (i.e., preempt) existing state law. The presumption is employed when
Congress unquestionably has the authority to preempt and so is not about
any constitutional boundary. It is, rather, a statutory interpretation doctrine
76. Id. at 2606 n.14 (majority opinion).
77. Id. at 2657 (joint dissent).
78. Id. at 2606.
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that acknowledges Congress’s discretion to move the line of state-federal
regulatory authority, but demands a more public, accountable, and
deliberative federal political process—by requiring Congress to be
particularly explicit—when it does so.
The Court has devised similar rules that require Congress to speak extra
clearly when it legislates in areas of traditional state authority or wishes to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. It is no fluke that each of these
doctrines emerged within the last century. Unlike many other American
statutory interpretation rules, which have traditions going back to old
English practice, these doctrines are the interpretive rules of the modern
regulatory state. They are a direct judicial response to the way that the New
Deal changed how federalism works.
The doctrine at issue in health reform’s Medicaid expansion was
precisely one of these informal, federalism-protective rules of statutory
interpretation. The so-called Pennhurst rule79 requires Congress to speak
clearly when it attaches strings to grants of federal money to the states.
Though most often taught in constitutional-law courses, Pennhurst is also a
statutory-interpretation doctrine. At bottom, the rule is about Congress’s
intentions and the clarity with which Congress speaks, not about the limits
of Congress’s authority. Pennhurst tells us that Congress has the discretion
to attach whatever (legal) conditions it likes to its statutes, as long as it
makes those conditions clear.
The Court applied the Pennhurst rule in the ACA case but did not truly
follow it. The Court recognized that Congress included the clear statement
that Pennhurst requires: the Medicaid statute expressly reserves to
Congress the “right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the
statute.80 But the Court layered on top of that rule its muddy, “somechanges-are-too-much-regardless-of-the-warning” doctrine that now makes
it impossible for Congress to predict when it will be invoked.
One explanation for the cloudiness of the ACA’s new rule may be the
Court’s reluctance to go further down the road of acknowledging federalism
as a creature of Congress’s creation. Pennhurst suggested that the threat to
state sovereignty is eliminated when Congress makes its intentions plain.
Perhaps the Court was no longer content to rest with that rule because the
Court realized that the Pennhurst doctrine is much more about federal
statutory design than about state sovereignty in the first place.
Indeed, the entire ACA opinion contains this tension. The Court moved
uneasily between recognizing Congress’s broad power to legislate and
attempting to protect the historical limits on that power. Consider, for
example, how this tension between modern statutory power and traditional
constitutional restraints is evident in the Court’s decision on the insurancepurchase-mandate question. There, the Court claimed to apply a rule of
statutory interpretation, the so-called doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
79. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
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to save the mandate from unconstitutionality by “interpreting” it as a tax.81
The Court then walked an awkward line by holding that Congress has the
power to control the labels that it uses for some purposes, but not for
others.82 Throughout, the Chief Justice invoked the importance of state
sovereignty six times.83
It is constitutional heresy to suggest that the concept of state sovereignty
might be a poor fit, even when we are talking about a federal legislative
landscape in which the states play a role only at Congress’s discretion. But
to press the point, the states are not the only implementers of federal
statutes. Congress also routinely relies on nonprofits, quasi-governmental
associations and for-profit entities to implement federal law. No one
contends that those players are sovereigns in any sense, even though their
role in federal statutory implementation is often quite similar to that of the
states.
None of this is to say that the states are not important players in our
government structure or that sovereignty is not a relevant concept to
describe many other aspects of the states’ existence (such as their control of
their own government structures). This is an argument about how,
realistically, state policymaking can remain productive and relevant within
the ever-expanding landscape of federal lawmaking.
Of course, not everyone agrees that states should be aggressive national
policymakers in the first place, and each context is unique. But even those
who generally resist federalism might focus closer attention on state
implementation of federal law and, in particular, on the parallel between
state and private implementation noted above. If one alternative to state-led
federal statutory schemes is a bigger federal government, another
alternative is more privatization of what previously had been government
work. Many scholars have raised accountability, transparency, and
democracy concerns associated with this trend toward privatization. One
might consider whether state implementation is preferable to privatization;
indeed, whether state implementation is a buffer to the withdrawal of
government altogether.84 So understood, state implementation of federal
law is a phenomenon that both nationalists and federalists may have interest
in preserving.

81. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01. In my view, however, the Court did not apply the
doctrine properly. The doctrine is best understood as an aid in the interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language, not as an aid in choosing among several constitutional hooks
for text whose meaning is clear.
82. See id. Specifically, the Court held that it would respect Congress’s decision to call
the “tax” a “penalty” for purposes of whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition on preenforcement challenges applied, but that it would decide for itself whether the mandate was
a “tax” for purposes of Congress’s power to enact it in the first place.
83. See id. at 2578, 2602–03.
84. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalizations, and
Statization: Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L.
162 (2013).
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Consider in this light, then, some statutory-law alternatives to
sovereignty-focused constitutional-law doctrine. I have argued previously
that one of the most important, but often ignored, federalism relationships
on the ground is the intergovernmental administrative relationship; the
relative power of federal administrators over the state administrators
concurrently entrusted with implementing federal laws.85 The Constitution
has nothing explicit to tell us about how tightly federal agencies can tie
their state partners’ hands when Congress asks both federal and state
administrators to co-regulate. But statutory interpretation doctrine might.
We already have statutory interpretation rules that give federal agencies
leeway to implement federal laws, and similar rules could be developed that
give such deference to state implementers or that even change the balance
of power at times between federal and state agencies. My own recent
empirical work with Lisa Bressman suggests the possibility that Congress
sometimes does intend to give state implementers more policyimplementation discretion than that for which current doctrine allows.86
In fact, the ambiguities currently attendant to these interagency
relationships are precisely what have been cited in the health reform context
as the reason for some states’ refusals to operate their own insurance
exchanges. States claim that they do not have enough information about
how much discretion they will have to implement the statute themselves or
what rules the Department of Health and Human Services will impose on
them.87 States have voiced similar concerns with respect to other parts of
the statute.88 None of these concerns stems from arguments about
constitutional boundaries—that is, about the federal government’s power to
regulate in the area in the first place. Rather, these are arguments about
how state implementation will be operationalized and the respective powers
of state and federal agencies, all within statutes that everyone agrees
Congress has legitimately enacted. Current legal doctrine, however, does
not assist in regulating these relationships.
In a similar vein, Professor Erin Ryan has argued that legal doctrine
should oversee the fairness of the political bargaining process—the behindthe-scenes negotiations between state and federal actors—and not the
contours of the ultimate result.89 The Court-created federalism “clearstatement rules” already in play and discussed above are of the same order:
those rules do not prohibit any particular policy outcome. Rather, they are
an effort to shape the legislative process, and to give additional leverage to
85. See Gluck, supra note 14.
86. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript on file with author).
87. See, e.g., Jason Millman, Chris Christie Nixes State-Run Insurance Exchange,
POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2012, 5:03 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/christie-nixesstate-run-insurance-exchange-84718.html.
88. See Gluck, supra note 14, at 578–79.
89. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in
the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 650–65 (2007).
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federalist voices in how statutes are designed.90 Those who have raised
concerns about asymmetries across the horizontal-federalism landscape
might similarly think more about how the statutory design process might be
restructured to better equalize power across states.
Admittedly, each of these paths may plunge courts precisely into the kind
of political terrain that courts generally eschew. But that discomfort—and
the recognition that the political arena is where these boundaries
increasingly must be worked out—would seem a reason for courts further to
limit their intervention in Congress’s statutory work, and not a reason for
courts to rely on antiquated constitutional doctrine to provide them with a
more familiar, even if inapposite, path to decision.
It also is exceedingly difficult to determine when a particular federal
statutory structure is in the “state interest,” not only because the states are
not always a cohesive unit, but also because what the metric might be is not
clear. Federalism is associated with many different kinds of benefits, and
different federal statutes generate different packages of those benefits.
Some statutes, for example, may encourage more local participation but less
experimentation, while others do the opposite. Who is to say which statute
is “sufficiently” federalist? In the health reform context, for example, we
do not yet have enough information to evaluate the question of how stateprotective the health-insurance exchange provisions ultimately will be.
What we can say, however, is that thanks to the ACA’s intrastatutory
federalism, Massachusetts now is operating an insurance exchange through
which it can screen and exclude insurance plans offered, while Utah
simultaneously has chosen to operate an open-market model exchange in
which all insurers are welcome. That diversity and deference to local
governmental preferences likely would not have been possible in a single
federal model. There is something that rings of federalism here, but is it
“enough” (and enough for what)? Ultimately, our modern federalism may
best be understood as existing on a continuum rather than as a feature that is
either present or absent from a regulatory scheme.
One final point: if federalism doctrine ultimately does move toward rules
aimed at how Congress drafts statutes rather than constitutional rules that
police outcomes, it will be incumbent upon the Court to adhere to the
statutory rules that it announces. One of the most important, and
unanswered, questions for modern statutory law is the extent to which
Congress and the Court are in dialogue over statutory interpretation; that is,
the extent to which Congress legislates in the shadow of the Court’s
interpretive doctrines and the extent to which the Court, in turn, respects
Congress’s intentions.91 Any set of legal rules that aims to make Congress
speak more clearly must be heard and employed by legislative drafters. In
90. See also Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process, the Jurisprudence of
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 418–19 (suggesting that clear statement
rules might be ways for judges to adopt a more deferential stance to Congress while still
safeguarding federalism).
91. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 86.
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the context of the Medicaid expansion, the Court damaged its own
credibility as a reliable partner in that dialectical relationship by saying “not
good enough” when Congress employed precisely the kind of disclaimer for
which the Court previously had asked.
CONCLUSION
Traditional federalists embrace state power in the absence, or instead, of
federal authority. And they view autonomy as the ballgame. It is this
traditional federalism that the Court wished to resuscitate in the ACA
litigation. But that option was never on the political table when it came to
designing the health reform statute. The congressional majority that passed
the ACA was convinced that national legislation was necessary. And so
Congress proceeded as it typically does, changing national policy by
building on already-existing federal laws that themselves were the result of
incremental federal legislation over a backdrop of historical state control.
The outcome was major federal legislation that, instead of marginalizing the
states, kept them front and center. The Court misread the ACA as a statute
that is fundamentally anti-state, when in fact it is state empowering in many
respects. The ACA creates precisely the kinds of partnerships that maintain
the states’ relevance in the modern statutory era, and the federalists may
wish to think twice before again discouraging them.

